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What Reagan Faced 
[Ojnce we have Latin America, we won't have to take the United 
States, the last bastion of capitalism, because it will fall into our 
outstretched hands like overripe fruit. 
-Ronald Reagan, quoting Lenin 
Imagine it is 1980, and you have gathered a random selection of five 
hundred people, made up of political scientists, historians, members of 
Congress, geopolitical experts, and the first hundred individuals listed in 
the Boston telephone directory. You have told them that in eleven years' 
time, the Cold War would be over, that there would be a clear winner of 
the Cold War, and that one of the two antagonists would no longer exist 
and then asked them to predict which superpower would be the winner. 
The overwhelming majority would have predicted the Soviet Union. 
The world that Ronald Reagan faced when he ran for president 
in 1980 seemed to be increasingly hostile to the continued existence of 
the United States as a free and independent country. As overly dramatic 
as that statement sounds today, twenty years after the end of the Soviet 
Union, a look at the world as it existed in 1980 will serve to illustrate just 
how daunting the geopolitical challenges were for America as its citizens 
prepared to elect a president. 
Among these challenges, a couple of small-scale and low-intensity 
guerrilla wars in Central America may not appear to loom large. Yet this 
region would become the site of the first serious effort to roll back the area 
of Soviet influence in the world, and as such, it would become a vital part 
of the drama that ended the Cold War in the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
significance of Central America in 1980, however, was obscured by other 
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contemporary events that seemed more immediate and more threatening 
to the United States. 
On the surface, Latin America, and Central America in particular, 
would not seem to be a promising area for Soviet intervention. Given 
Central America's proximity to the American mainland, interference by 
the Soviets could be expected to bring an immediate and decisive Ameri-
can response that would almost certainly result in an embarrassing Soviet 
retreat. In 1962, just such an outcome had followed the Soviet attempt to 
deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. On other occasions, the US. government 
had used military force to reverse, or forestall, what American officials 
saw as threatening encroachments by outside powers. (Such uninvited 
forays by countries outside the Western Hemisphere were exactly what 
the Monroe Doctrine was designed to prohibit.) 
Since the Soviet Union could hardly compete with America at such 
a geographic disadvantage, the Communist superpower spent the first 
fifteen years of the Cold War doing not much more than waiting for an 
indigenous leftist revolution to provide it with an opportunity, a policy 
that bore fruit with the alliance with Fidel Castro in 1960. While the 
Cuban Missile Crisis had resulted in the withdrawal of missiles from the 
island, ending the ability of the Soviets to directly threaten the United 
States from Cuba, the Castro regime emerged from the crisis with a 
guarantee that the US. government would not try to overthrow it. Thus, 
Cuba still provided many opportunities and possibilities for the Soviets to 
threaten US. interests indirectly, using the Communist island as a base. 
The region had other conditions besides its susceptibility to Cuban 
interference that recommended it as a suitable place for the Soviets to 
challenge the United States. In 1978, Latin America boasted only two 
democratic countries, Venezuela and Colombia. Every country south 
of the Rio Grande was plagued by poverty, disease, illiteracy, and the 
despair that comes from decades of wide and seemingly unbridgeable 
gaps between the tiny wealthy elite and the vast poor majority. Nearly 
every country in Latin America suffered from chronic political instability. 
Every country in Latin America contained an intellectual elite and a large 
percentage of the general population who blamed the United States for its 
problems. In many cases Latin American countries had recent memories 
of American military or economic intervention. Many had dictators in 
power who repeatedly proclaimed their allegiance to the United States. 
Societal institutions that had stood for decades as anti-Communist 
bulwarks in Latin America were growing weaker in the 1970s. Landed 
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aristocracies in several Latin American countries were shrinking in size 
and waning in political influence, thanks in part to the land reform pro-
grams that were a significant (and well-intentioned) part of President John 
F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Large business owners, as they grew 
closer and closer to American business interests, also grew less and less 
influential in their own capital cities. In fact, American-linked businesses 
grew vulnerable to punitive legislation from governments unwilling to 
challenge American businesses directly but more than willing to pursue 
their proxies. 
At the same time, reform-minded, non-Communist politicians 
found themselves the first victims of military dictatorships. Latin Ameri-
can Communists had long experience with acting in secret and going into 
hiding, an experience that moderate political leaders did not share. Thus, 
the latter were much more vulnerable to repressive actions. Their vulner-
ability was heightened by the Communists' practice of betraying their 
less radical comrades to the military authorities. Military governments 
in Latin America also found centrist politicians more amenable to taking 
positions in military governments. For the most part, the centrists were 
well-intentioned, and in some cases they did serve to soften the harshness 
of dictatorial rule, but their presence in regimes that menaced human 
rights discredited them and the parties that they represented. Another 
anti-Communist bulwark was weakened. 
Finally, the Roman Catholic Church in much of Latin America was 
also sharply divided. While the old-style right-wing Catholic cleric was 
almost a thing of the past in the 1970s, some specimens still existed. They 
were opposed by a much larger number of priests, nuns, and hierarchy 
who were willing to challenge those in power with demands for greater 
religious freedom and more economic opportunity. A small percentage 
of activist clergy and religious embraced "liberation theology:' an attempt 
to merge the Gospel with the writings of Karl Marx. Liberation theology 
would have a great impact on U.S. foreign policy in Nicaragua, where the 
presence of Marxist priests in the government would confuse, and often 
totally paralyze, American policy makers. Elsewhere, the new theology 
divided the Catholic Church so that the institution's voice in the public 
sphere became garbled, confused, and ineffectual. 
As the 1970s progressed, what was surprising was not that there was 
strong Soviet interest in the continent and the geopolitical opportunities 
that it contained but that a concerted effort by the Soviets to gain allies in 
the Western Hemisphere had taken so long to appear. The Soviet Union 
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had never entirely ignored the region, as evidenced by its embrace of 
Fidel Castro, and its efforts to promote or support revolutionary activity 
in Guatemala in the 1950s, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic in the 
1960s, and Chile in the 1970s. But these earlier Soviet efforts had been 
halfhearted and tentative. Often, the Soviets seemed more risk-averse in 
Latin America than elsewhere. Soviet officials evidently considered Latin 
America an area where they would have to be completely reactive and 
opportunistic. 
But there is another possibility. Soviet geopolitical planners might 
have seen Latin America as a place where significant intervention would 
have to wait until the U.S. government was completely preoccupied with 
crises in other parts of the world. As Reagan prepared to run for president 
in 1980, America had reached exactly that level of preoccupation, as a 
tour of the world of 1979-1980 shows. 
The WOrld in 1980 
Southeast Asia and the "Vietnam Syndrome" 
American foreign policy after 1975, when the remaining U.S. forces were 
driven from Saigon, was dominated by the defeat in Vietnam. No Ameri-
can living in 1975 could remember a time when the United States had 
even had to settle for a draw in a major military conflict. By 1975, there 
were no Confederate veterans left, the only Americans to have experienced 
wartime defeat. The dominant wartime memories of adult Americans in 
1975 were the triumphant images of World War II. When Americans 
thought of how wars ended, they thought of ticker tape parades for return-
ing soldiers, of vanquished enemies, and of grateful, liberated populations. 
Thus, the photos of Americans fighting for a place on the last helicopter 
out of Saigon became indelible. 
Nor did the nightmare end with the melee on the roof of the Ameri-
can embassy in April. By the beginning of May, Laos and Cambodia had 
been taken over by Communist forces, and South Vietnam had ceased 
to exist as an independent country. Even to refer to the largest city in 
Vietnam meant honoring the founder of Vietnamese Communism, since 
his heirs renamed Saigon, Ho Chi Minh City. The often-ridiculed domino 
theory seemed to be coming true, as Thailand and even the Philippines, 
usually a staunch U.S. ally, found it worthwhile to limit their ties to the 
United States, and especially to the U.S. military. 
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Even those who respected and honored the sacrifice of American 
soldiers in Vietnam were wary of any more such overseas military com-
mitments, no matter how just or urgent the cause seemed to be. For the 
dominant voices in the American media, in Congress, and in academia, 
the relevant lesson of the Vietnam disaster was broader and deeper than 
the mere advent of caution in committing American forces abroad. The 
"Vietnam Syndrome" became the name for the firmly held belief that the 
use of American military power, anywhere in the world, would almost cer-
tainly lead to failure. Moreover, the nature of the American government 
and the American military was such that any use of American military 
force was not only doomed to fail but also bound to be immoral. 
The long shadow of Vietnam loomed over all the debates about 
Central America in the 1980s. Of all the arguments that Reagan's critics 
used to try to derail his Central America policy, none was repeated more 
frequently than the charge that Reagan was leading America into "another 
Vietnam." A popular bumper strip at the time read, "EI Salvador Is Span-
ish for Vietnam:' It often seemed that to confront the Soviets effectively 
in Central America in the 1980s, Reagan had to refight, and try to win, 
a war left over from the 1960s and 1970s. 
Hostages in Iran; Soviets in Afghanistan 
As humiliating and tragic as were events in Southeast Asia at the end 
of the 1970s, events at the other end of Asia seemed to be far more 
frightening in the short run and more threatening in the long run. The 
Soviets allied themselves with the Arab states demanding the destruction 
of Israel and provided states such as Egypt and Syria with weapons and 
money to attack Israel. In October 1973, the Soviets brought about a 
nuclear alert by threatening to intervene in the Yom Kippur War between 
Israel and Egypt. 
The U.S.S.R. also seemed to see in the Middle East an opportunity 
to overturn a fundamental U.S. foreign policy. Since the end of World War 
II, the core of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union had been "containing" 
its imperial ambitions behind a wall of military installations and political 
alliances. An essential part of the containment strategy was preventing the 
Soviet Union from gaining access to a warm water port. With the new 
Vietnamese regime permitting Soviet naval access to the American-built 
port facilities in Cam Rahn Bay, the Soviets had acquired access to a 
year-round port, but only indirectly. 
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In the late 1970s, the leadership of the US.S.R. took determined 
actions to acquire an outlet to the Indian Ocean. This was a goal that had 
fascinated leaders in the Kremlin since before the October Revolution. In 
January 1978, the Soviet government sponsored a coup that replaced a 
neutral government in Afghanistan with one more friendly to the Soviet 
Union. The coup went largely unnoticed in the West. In 1978, Afghanistan 
was arguably one of the least familiar countries in the world to Americans, 
who were blissfully unaware of the fact that the country would rarely leave 
center stage for the succeeding three decades. 
Also in 1978, a popular uprising in Iran threatened the thirty-year-
old regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi. The shah had come to power with the 
aid of the US. government and had been returned to power after a 1953 
coup, also with US. government assistance. Like many client rulers pre-
ferred by American policy makers, the shah had limited popular support. 
Thus, he had to rely heavily on American assistance, both financial and 
military, to survive. (This situation is what makes clients like the shah 
attractive to some Washington policy makers in the first place, as we will 
see in chapter 2.) 
Under the Carter administration, US. military assistance to the 
shah's government was significantly reduced. By cutting off aid to a long-
time American client, whose regime was in genuine danger, Carter kept 
a campaign promise to put human rights at the top of America's foreign 
policy list of priorities. At the same time, the aid reduction also alerted 
the shah that some of his recent actions, such as joining the oil boycott 
against the West in 1973 and 1974, were unacceptable to the United States. 
The cut-off had the desired short-term effect; the shah promised to be 
more respectful of human rights. 
For Iranians who wanted to be rid of the shah, his promises to be 
more humane did nothing to make the shah seem less autocratic. They 
did, however, make the shah look like someone willing to take orders from 
the American embassy. Increasingly, the shah was caught on the horns of 
a dilemma. Whatever actions he took to appease American policy makers 
concerned with human rights worsened his image in Iran and crippled 
his regime. Whatever actions he took to effectively fight the insurgency 
alienated his only overseas source of support. 
In the end, the contradiction became irreconcilable. On January 16, 
1979, the shah fled the country. Two weeks later, exiled religious leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini returned from France to establish the Islamic revolu-
tionary government of Iran. To expedite the shah's departure, the Carter 
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administration promised that he would eventually be allowed to enter the 
United States, ostensibly for medical treatment. This promise enraged the 
shah's Iranian enemies, who wanted him returned to Iran for trial. Their 
anger would explode into the crisis that destroyed the Carter presidency. 
In November 1979, demonstrators in Teheran attacked the US. 
Embassy, the visible symbol of American power. The militants made it 
clear they were prepared to hold the embassy personnel as long as it took 
for the US. government to turn over the shah. The American hostages 
were paraded through Teheran blindfolded, and the militants threatened 
to place them on trial for "war crimes:' 
President Carter responded by closing the Iranian Embassy in the 
United States and freezing Iranian government assets in American banks. 
But he made the unfortunate statement a few days after the embassy sei-
zure that "the most important concern for all Americans at this moment 
is safety of our fellow citizens held in Teheran. . . . None of us would 
want to do anything that would worsen the danger in which our fellow 
Americans have been placed. . . . All Americans, public officials and 
private citizens alike, [should) exercise restraint, and keep the safety of 
their countrymen uppermost in their minds and hearts:' 
By stating that securing the release of the hostages, safe and 
unharmed, would be his top priority in dealing with the crisis, Carter 
alerted both the militants at the embassy and the Iranian government 
that no forceful or punitive US. military action would be forthcoming. 
Under the circumstances, the dispatch of an American aircraft carrier 
battle group to the Persian Gulf seemed almost comically impotent. In 
April 1980, comedy turned to tragedy when a rescue attempt was aborted, 
and eight American Marines were killed in the Iranian desert. 
Certainly the presence of the American military was no deterrent to 
the Soviets, who continued their advance toward the Indian Ocean. With 
the US. government paralyzed by the actions of a third-rate power such 
as Iran, the way seemed open to secure Afghanistan once and for all. On 
Christmas Eve, 1979, tens of thousands of soldiers from the Soviet Red 
Army invaded Afghanistan, supposedly at the "invitation" of the country's 
pro-Soviet leader. Within weeks, the Soviets seemed in control of most of 
the country. In retrospect, this turned out to be the last advance of the 
Red Army, but at the time, all that was clear was that the Soviet leader-
ship had achieved a new level of daring and confidence. 
Carter's options were extremely limited. The United States would 
have required the cooperation of Pakistan, at the least, to mount a direct 
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military response to the Soviet invasion, even if Carter had had the luxury 
of assuming that such direct military confrontation would not have led to 
a wider superpower war. (The most dramatic option available, the dispatch 
of American military forces to contest the Soviet invasion, would have 
put U.S. and Soviet troops in direct confrontation for the first time in all 
the years of the Cold War.) 
Still, Carter's response seemed particularly weak. He announced a 
boycott of grain sales to the Soviet Union and declared that Americans 
would not participate in the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. Not 
surprisingly, neither of these actions induced the Soviets to call off their 
occupation. Later, Carter would state emphatically that an attempt by any 
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded 
as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and 
such an assault would be repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force. But with the U.S. military seemingly unable even to free 
fifty-two hostages from Iran, Carter's threat rang hollow. 
In the spring of 1980, resistance among the Afghans was stiffening, 
but the Soviets' hold on the country in 1980 seemed secure enough to 
permit the Kremlin leaders to make plans to either neutralize or invade 
Pakistan and finally acquire their warm water port. A major shift in the 
superpower balance of power seemed imminent, even as the American 
hostages languished in Teheran. 
A statement often attributed to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev runs: 
"We will take the two great treasure chests upon which the west depends: 
the strategic oil reserves in the Middle East and the strategic minerals in 
South Africa:' The quotation is apocryphal but did not seem outlandish 
as Reagan prepared to run for the presidency. 
Taking Advantage of Upheaval in Southern Africa 
Meanwhile, Brezhnev's other "treasure chest" in southern Africa was also 
undergoing potentially cataclysmic upheavals of direct import to the Unit-
ed States. In 1974, the new socialist government of Portugal announced 
that it would move to grant its African colonies independence as soon 
as possible. By 1976, two of these former Portuguese colonies, Angola 
and Mozambique, were governed by Marxist governments that established 
friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Both Mozambique, on the east 
coast of Africa and Angola on the west coast bordered South African 
territory. (Angola abutted what was then called "South West Africa," a 
colony of South Africa. It is now the independent country of Namibia.) 
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South Africa itself was, and remains, one of the world's only two 
major sources of many minerals vital to both the U.S. defense industry and 
the U.S. economy. Among South Africa's assets are gold, platinum, iridium, 
titanium, and diamonds. Since South Africa had the only extensive port 
facilities in the region, and since virtually all of southern Africa's rail links 
ran to South African ports, the country was also a major source for cobalt, 
copper, and uranium from neighboring countries. To make the strategic 
situation even more serious, the Soviet Union itself was the only source 
outside of southern Africa for some of these strategically vital minerals. 
The whites who ran South Africa in the 1970s reacted to the inde-
pendence of Angola and Mozambique, and their subsequent embrace 
of Communism, by helping to fund insurgencies in both countries. The 
South Africans did 'not give either UNITA (the Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola) or RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) 
enough to win their wars against their Marxist rulers. Instead, they gave 
only enough to keep the wars going, to keep both former Portuguese 
colonies from rising above the level of abject poverty. This would prevent 
either country from becoming an example, or a refuge, for South Africa's 
black population. As an example of cynical statecraft, this South African 
policy has few equals. 
It was also unparalleled in the opportunities that it gave to the 
Soviets to spread their influence in the region. The Soviet leadership 
knew it could give huge amounts of weaponry and other aid to Angola 
and Mozambique virtually without political cost. Any nation that raised 
objections to Soviet intervention in southern Africa could be accused of 
being proapartheid. In 1976, the Soviets airlifted Cuban troopS to Angola, 
prompting belated but near-hysterical protests from American secretary 
of state Henry Kissinger. 
It was in Angola that the "Vietnam Syndrome" appeared most obvi-
ously. In 1975, Kissinger warned of the danger of Soviet troops in Angola 
and suggested that the United States might be forced to confront the 
Soviet effort there. Congress not only rejected Kissinger's warnings but 
also responded by passing the Clark Amendment, which banned any use 
of American forces in Angola. The amendment's airtight language also 
banned financial support to anyone fighting in Angola. (As we will see, 
the Boland Amendments, which sought to impose a similar ban on aid to 
the Nicaraguan rebels, were not nearly as ironclad. This fact would lead 
to some grave political miscalculations during the Reagan years.) Absent 
American intervention, the main protagonists in southern Africa were 
Cuba, the Soviet Union, and South Africa. 
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By 1980, the Soviets had transported fifty thousand Cuban soldiers 
to Angola to fight alongside the country's Marxist army. A substantially 
smaller number of Cuban and Soviet troops supported the Mozambican 
government. With Soviet troops on both coasts of southern Africa, and 
the internal situation in South Africa becoming more unstable, the pos-
sibility of a long-term disruption of strategic mineral supplies loomed 
large. The Soviets had an enormous advantage in the fact that they did not 
need to place a pro-Soviet regime in power in South Africa. The Soviets 
could achieve their geopolitical goals merely by adding to the region's 
disruption. The danger of a prolonged interruption of strategic mineral 
supplies took its place alongside American policy makers' growing anxiety 
about oil supplies from the Middle East. Again, a major shift in the global 
balance of power was only a step away. 
Western Europe: An Alliance in Trouble 
As the United States found itself seriously threatened in many parts of 
the world in 1980, it could not even count on strong support from the 
members of the NATO alliance. Virtually every NATO country had a 
strong and growing "peace movement" in place by 1980. Even in Britain, 
there were calls for unilateral disarmament in the late 1970s. The alliance's 
resolve to deter and, if necessary, confront a Soviet attack on Western 
Europe seemed less and less certain. Matters were most serious in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany, as it was called at the time) 
where a succession of Social Democratic Party governments had pursued 
"Ostpolitik;' an effort to improve relations both with the Soviets and with 
their Eastern European allies. In practice, Ostpolitik seemed invariably to 
mean a weakening of West German commitment to the NATO alliance. 
NATO was weakening just as a new Eastern European crisis was 
brewing. Since the visit of Pope John Paul II to his homeland in June 1979, 
Poles had been constantly challenging the legitimacy of the Soviet-backed 
government and demanding more freedom. In December 1980, it seemed 
that Soviet patience with the Polish government's efforts to confront the 
"Solidarity" trade union and its adherents was being exhausted. Under 
the cover of "routine maneuvers;' Soviet troops were moving ominously 
close to Poland, and the warnings from the Soviet government were grow-
ing more stern and uncompromising. The crisis passed without a Soviet 
military intervention, but not without disturbing questions about what, if 
anything, NATO could have done in the face of Soviet aggression. 
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Military Weakness at Home 
The late 1970s saw unprecedented tensions in the NATO alliance and 
myriad threats to u.s. interests around the world. These difficulties were 
compounded by serious problems with the u.s. military. Yet another 
manifestation of the "Vietnam Syndrome" was the reluctance of Mem-
bers of Congress to adequately fund the armed forces. Sharp cutbacks in 
defense spending from 1973-1979 had left every branch of the military 
in a precarious condition. 
Among the areas in which Congress cut back was pay and benefits 
for soldiers, especially for enlisted men and women. By 1980, many sol-
diers' families required food stamps to survive. Maintenance expenditures 
were also cut, leaving the Navy with ships barely able to leave port, and 
the other branches with tanks, trucks and planes often immobilized by 
repair problems and shortages of spare parts. 
Even more worrisome, the fitness and morale of the troops were 
declining. With pay so low, all branches of the service found themselves 
lowering standards to fulfill recruitment quotas. Poor living conditions 
and a feeling of disdain from civilians left many soldiers bitter and 
inclined to direct their bitterness at their officers. In the navy, there were 
ships in which officers did not enter enlisted quarters without an armed 
escort. Racial strife and drug addiction, both holdovers of the Vietnam 
experience, also plagued the military in the 1970s. These signs of weak-
ness were not lost on the Soviet leadership or on America's increasingly 
nervous allies. 
Domestic turmoil of such a prolonged and serious nature has a 
devastating impact on foreign and military policy, especia\ly when those 
policies require, above all else, consistent application of principle. The 
dominant U.S. foreign policy of containment cannot exist without a more 
or less continuous American commitment to vigilance and determined 
action, coupled with a well-maintained American military to provide con-
tainment's muscle when needed. 
While still rhetorically committed to containment, America's leaders 
in 1980 seemed to have redefined the term. When the word containment 
was coined in 1947, it meant leaving the Soviets in control of what they 
had already acquired but denying them any additional territory. By 1980, 
containment seemed to mean conceding to the Soviets all they already 
had, plus whatever they wanted next. Of all the areas in which the Sovi-
ets challenged the United States in the late 1970s, only the thrust into 
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Afghanistan, where the Soviets' role was absolutely undeniable, brought 
strong and bipartisan condemnation in the U.S. government. In every 
other region, the majority of American opinion leaders seemed deter-
mined to define Soviet adventurism as something else and to take refuge 
in the indirectness of the Soviet action to deny that there was any Soviet 
intervention in the first place. 
Latin America: The Cold War Moves Closer to Home 
From this willful blindness, the Soviet leadership learned that using 
proxies, and especially Cuban proxies, was extremely useful in covering 
their own involvement. Ambiguity about Soviet involvement in the many 
trouble spots of the late 1970s was a major asset in the Soviets' efforts 
to overwhelm the U.S. with geopolitical challenges, while simultaneously 
preventing decisive American action. Since Cuban proxies were obviously 
of most use in Latin America, it became almost inevitable that Latin 
America would become a central front in the Cold War in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Yet at the very time that the Soviet leadership was turning its eyes 
toward Latin America, the Carter foreign policy team was turning away. 
Memos from the early days of the Carter administration reveal that Cart-
er's national security assistant for Latin America stated on March 14, 1977: 
"[W)e do not need a Latin American policy, and I hope that in the future, 
we will not have one:' Nor was this view limited to one assistant. Sum-
marizing the discussion of foreign policy principals for President Carter, 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote on 31 March: "The 
participants agreed that we should not have a different policy for the 
hemisphere than we have for the rest of the world" (emphasis in origi-
nal.). Carter's top foreign policy advisors saw no special national security 
requirements for the region closest to the United States. 
In 1978, the Soviet Union perceived yet another good reason for 
thinking that more intensive intervention in Latin America might bear 
fruit. President Carter's first important policy decision regarding the West-
ern Hemisphere was to press for Senate ratification of the Panama Canal 
treaties. Carter used every public relations tool at his disposal to press 
wavering senators for a vote in favor of ratification. The treaties were 
ratified in the spring of 1978, by close votes, and the Panama Canal issue 
was one of the few foreign policy "successes" of the Carter years. 
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The initial reaction in much of Latin America to Carter's effort to 
disengage the U.S. government from the Panama Canal was positive. But 
in Havana and Moscow, leaders saw the American effort somewhat differ-
ently. The president of Panama in 1978 was Omar Torrijos, a dictator who 
had close ties to Fidel Castro. During the Senate hearings on ratification 
of the Canal treaties, it was disclosed that Torrijos had been involved in 
running guns to Marxist revolutionaries in Central Ame~ica, smuggling 
drugs to the United States at the behest of Cuba, and laundering money 
for extremists of both the Right and the Left. Moreover, Torrijos and 
Manuel Noriega, his chief lieutenant, had crushed democratic movements 
in Panama. Even some Americans who supported the eventual restoration 
of the Canal to Panama resisted returning such a valuable asset to such 
an unsavory and potentially dangerous dictator. 
The Carter administration's apparent lack of scruples about doing 
business with the thoroughly corrupt and dictatorial Torrijos regime 
induced Castro and Brezhnev to conclude that the U.S. government was 
determined to withdraw, at any cost, from its most important strategic 
asset in Latin America. Such determination indicated that less valuable 
allies and assets in the region would be jettisoned, too, if the pressure 
to do so were sufficient. In March 1979, the Soviets closely watched 
American reaction to the disclosure that a full Soviet combat brigade 
was stationed in Cuba. In spite of strong and urgent protests from con-
gressmen and senators of both parties, the Carter administration mini-
mized the importance of Soviet combat troops ninety miles from U.S. 
soil. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Panama Canal treaty ratifica-
tion, Castro got more directly involved in promoting revolution in Latin 
America, and especially in Central America. While the Castro regime had 
supported Marxist revolutionary movements in Latin America since the 
early 1960s, much of this aid had consisted of small amounts of money 
or weapons and was designed more to induce a repressive response from 
the targeted government than anything else. Castro himself had usually 
kept his regime's involvement an official secret. In 1978, however, Castro 
invited (some of the participants would later say that "summoned" was 
a better word) revolutionary leaders from EI Salvador and Nicaragua to 
separate meetings in Cuba. In both cases, the revolutionary leaders had 
been active for more than a decade but had made little headway against 
the governments of the two Central American republics. 
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Among the reasons for their lack of progress was disunity. Nica-
ragua had three separate Marxist rebel movements in 1978; El Salvador 
had five. At the meetings with Castro, the Cuban dictator insisted that 
the separate guerrilla movements merge. According to some accounts, 
Castro threatened death to any revolutionary leader who did not go along. 
All accounts agree that Castro promised substantial military and finan-
cial assistance, once the merger was completed. (Given Castro's complete 
dependence on the Soviet government at the time, it is unthinkable that 
he would have made such commitments without Soviet acquiescence.) 
Soon after receiving Castro's "offer:' the Sandinista factions merged, and 
the Faribundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) was formed 
in El Salvador. At the same time, both movements became more serious 
threats to the pro-American governments they opposed. 
Grenada's Marxist Revolution 
A combination of long-prevailing conditions, and Castro's intervention, 
culminated in three crucial revolutions in the Caribbean region in 1979. 
All of them altered u.S. foreign policy in the region, although this was 
not evident when they took place. The first revolution occurred in March 
on the island of Grenada. A Marxist movement overthrew the corrupt 
and increasingly erratic regime of Eric Gairy, who had ruled Grenada 
since the country's independence from Great Britain in 1974. Gairy was 
an almost perfect caricature of a right-wing dictator. He was personally 
corrupt and encouraged corruption among his subordinates. He sought 
to protect himself from criticism from democratic countries by professing 
anti-Communism and support for the United States. 
The New Jewel Movement was founded in 1973 by Maurice Bishop, 
a British-trained lawyer and, later, a Cuban-trained Marxist. After forc-
ing Gairy to flee the country, Bishop installed himself as president and 
implemented a relatively mild program of Marxist reform in Grenada. 
However, Bishop's ties with Castro and with the Soviet leadership grew 
closer very quickly. In early 1980, Bishop visited Castro in Havana and 
made arrangements to receive economic and military assistance from the 
Cuban leader. As captured documents later revealed, Bishop used the 
assistance he received to build a much larger army, capable of threaten-
ing his democratic neighbors. Bishop's regime also began work on a large 
new airstrip, capable of accommodating Soviet troop transports and heavy 
bombers. With Grenada alongside major sea lanes into the Caribbean, 
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the mere construction of such a large airstrip was worthy of concern. But 
with the other dramatic developments in other parts of the Caribbean, 
Bishop's nascent threat in 1979 went virtually unnoticed. 
Nicaragua's Sandinista Revolution 
On July 19, the second Caribbean Marxist revolution of the year ended 
with the triumphal march of the Sandinistas into Managua, Nicaragua. 
The previous day, long-time dictator Anastasio Somoza had fled the 
country. His departure marked the end of forty-five years of Nicaraguan 
governments dominated by the Somoza family. Like Gairy in Grenada, 
the Somozas made much of their supposedly close relationship with the 
United States government, and the last of the Somozas was invariably 
referred to as a "pro-American" dictator. The reality was somewhat more 
complicated. While the Somozas did indeed support the United States, it 
was less clear that the United States supported the Somozas. It is more 
accurate to say that the U.S. government tolerated the Somoza family, as 
it had tolerated the shah of Iran, both for its strong anti-Communism and 
for pursuing economic policies that prevented genuine economic growth. 
Somoza's rule began to unravel in December 1972, after a devastat-
ing earthquake hit the capital city of Managua. During the relief opera-
tions, Pittsburgh Pirates baseball player Roberto Clemente was killed. His 
death and the dramatic pictures of the' ruined city focused American 
attention on the plight of Nicaraguans, resulting in large contributions 
of aid. It soon became clear, however, that Somoza was trying to make 
money from the disaster, by directing aid funds for reconstruction to 
areas where he and his friends owned land. There was considerable anger 
among American members of Congress and Nicaraguan businessmen, 
two groups that had formerly tolerated the human rights abuses and stul-
tifying economic polices of the Somoza regime. 
Somoza had made many other powerful enemies by the late 1970s. 
His country was the first to send a diplomatic mission to the new state 
of Israel in 1948, garnering the Somoza family the enduring hatred of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In 1961, Nicaragua was a stag-
ing area for the Bay of Pigs invasion, a fact that Fidel Castro did not 
forget. During the negotiations over the Panama Canal treaty, Anastasio 
Somoza tried mightily to interest the U.S. government in a new, sea-level 
canal through Nicaragua. This earned him the hatred of Omar Torrijos. 
Somoza continued to believe, however, that his anti-Communist rhetoric 
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and "friendship" with the United States would bring the Americans to his 
aid if his regime faced real difficulties. 
In making this assumption, Somoza lost sight of the fact that, while 
his relationship with the United States was all-important to him, it was 
not a high priority for people in the U.S. government. In fact, the Carter 
administration came into office with plans to use Nicaragua and Iran as 
showcases for America's new commitment to human rights as a foreign 
policy priority. Soon after taking the oath of office, Carter cut off military 
assistance to Nicaragua, citing the regime's poor human rights record. At 
the same time, several committees of the U.S. House of Representatives 
began holding hearings on human rights abuses in Nicaragua. These hear-
ings often provided a forum for the most radical opponents of the regime, 
including members of the Marxist FSLN. 
Carter's Nicaragua policy, however, was not consistent. Aid was 
restored in 1978, as the military threat from the Sandinistas grew more 
serious. On August 22, 1978, the Sandinistas made their boldest stroke 
in the war up to that time, an attack on the National Palace in Managua. 
Shooting their way into the seat of the Nicaraguan government, the guer-
rillas held 1500 people hostage, including many members of the Nicara-
guan Congress. They demanded the release of fifty-nine colleagues from 
prison, $1 million in cash, and safe passage out of the country. For all of 
his tough talk about standing up to Communists, Somoza gave in to the 
FSLN's demands almost immediately. The attackers went to Cuba, where 
they received a hero's welcome. 
The spectacle of Somoza having to give in to the demands of the 
FSLN after a strike at the very heart of the Nicaraguan government made 
the dictator look weak, as did the tepid support he received during the 
crisis from the U.S. government. The following month saw the beginning 
of a general insurrection in the most populous departments of Nicara-
gua. Somoza responded with air strikes on civilian population centers 
suspected of supporting the FSLN. Somoza's heavy-handed response to 
the insurgency brought another cut-off of U.S. assistance. 
Also contributing to the American response was the success of 
the FSLN in presenting the world with a broad front of opposition to 
Somoza. While U.S. policy makers, both in Congress and in the Executive 
Branch, might have shied away from openly supporting a Marxist move-
ment (indeed, the Somoza family had counted on exactly such reluctance 
for the previous forty-five years), they were reassured by the presence 
of non-Marxists in the anti-Somoza coalition. Business leaders, church 
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leaders espousing liberation theology, and other seeming moderates stood 
alongside the Sandinista leadership in denouncing Somoza and promising 
to work together to build a new government "of neither the right nor the 
left" for the Nicaraguan people. After Somoza's departure, power rested in 
the hands of a five-person government of national reconstruction (GNR). 
The GNR featured prominent non-Communist moderates. 
Within months of the Sandinista triumph, however, it was becoming 
clear that the FSLN leaders had no intention of keeping their promises 
to bring democracy to Nicaragua. In early 1980, prominent moderates 
were expelled from the ruling Council of State, and Eden Pastora, who 
had led the raid on the National Palace, was also in opposition to the 
Sandinista regime. The regime was increasing its pressure on the country's 
independent newspaper, on the Catholic Church (in spite of the fact that 
the Church had supported the revolution, and the Bishop of Managua 
marked the Sandinista victory by saying a Victory Mass in Managua), 
and on independent businesses. 
Much more ominously for the United States, the FSLN began to. 
strengthen their ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The regime also made 
increasingly obvious efforts to export their revolution to other countries 
in Central America. Arms shipments and other forms of support began 
to flow from the Sandinistas to Communist revolutionaries in Honduras 
and EI Salvador. 
Much of the debate over Nicaragua in the 1980s revolved around 
whether the US. government, through its supposedly hostile actions, had 
driven the Sandinistas into the arms of Cuba and the Soviet Union. The 
actual events show anything but US. hostility. American Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance himself negotiated Somoza's departure. The US. government 
recognized the Sandinista government immediately. On September 2, 
1979, Carter welcomed Sandinista President Daniel Ortega, along with 
other top-ranking Sandinistas, to the White House. By the end of their 
meeting with Carter, the Sandinistas had a commitment of $118 million 
in US. aid. 
The Sandinistas and their supporters would later contend that the 
Sandinistas' embrace of Fidel Castro and the Soviet Union came only 
after Nicaragua was attacked by counterrevolutionaries in the pay of 
the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This conclusion is not 
supported by the facts either. High-level contacts between the Sandin is-
tas and Castro began even before the former had come to power. Then 
in March 1980, Ortega and Tomas Borge, head of Sandinista internal 
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security, traveled to Havana and received firm promises of support from 
Castro. By the end of 1980, the Sandinistas were supporting Communist 
guerrilla movements in EI Salvador and Honduras, and their leaders were 
speaking openly of a "revolution without frontiers:' The Sandinistas had 
adopted a policy of hostility to the United States and its allies before 
Reagan became president. 
EI Salvador's Democratic Revolution 
The Sandinistas' interest in fomenting revolution in EI Salvador was par-
ticularly revealing of their intentions, since EI Salvador in 1980 was not 
ruled by a typical right-wing military dictatorship like that of Somoza. In 
October, EI Salvador became the site of the third Caribbean revolution 
of 1979. Unlike the first two, however, the revolution in EI Salvador was 
non-Communist and promised genuine democracy for the small Central 
American nation. 
El Salvador's 1979 revolution was a nightmare for Americans accuS-
tomed to easily identifiable, black-and-white characters in stories from 
Latin America (evil landowners versus dedicated land reformers; evil mili-
tary dictators versus progressive democratic reformers). The upheaval was, 
first of all, fairly peaceful, since the departing military regime was suf-
fiCiently corrupt and rotten to fall without much violence. But what was 
more confusing for many Americans, what followed can best be described 
as a leftist (or at least left ish) civilian-military junta, a seeming contradic-
tion in terms. 
The postrevolutionary Salvadoran government was led by Jose 
Napoleon Duarte, the former mayor of San Salvador, whose reform cre-
dentials were unimpeachable. Duarte had been elected president in 1972 
but had been forced into exile by the military. As a political activist for the 
left-leaning Christian Democratic Party, he had opposed military govern-
ments in the past and had been jailed and tortured by members of the 
Salvadoran military. The junta that took power in 1979 included other 
reformers with similar antimilitary credentials. 
But the junta also contained a number of high-ranking military 
officers, some of whom had opposed democracy in the past. The division 
in the Salvadoran military mirrored the divisions in Salvadoran society. 
Again, for many American experts on Latin America, military officers 
came in only one variety: right-wing, antidemocratic, personally corrupt 
caricatures. 
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Opposing the civilian-military junta was the Faribundo Marti Lib-
eration Front (FMLN), an armed guerrilla group made up of the five 
revolutionary groups pressured and bribed into unity by Fidel Castro. 
In large part, it was fear of the progress of the FMLN that prompted a 
number of military officers to forsake their colleagues in 1979 and join 
the pro democracy junta. For some of these defecting military men, sup-
port for democracy was merely a cynical tactic, designed to fool the u.s. 
government into providing military and economic assistance. For others, 
the motivation was the genuine belief that only democracy could effec-
tively counter the promises of the Marxist FMLN. 
By 1979, it was clear to most Salvadorans that if the country were 
forced to choose between a traditional right-wing military dictatorship 
and a leftist revolutionary movement such as the FMLN, the latter would 
be the winner. Thus, when a third option appeared in 1979, in the form 
of the center-left junta, most analysts expected the threat from the FMLN 
to diminish. Exactly the opposite occurred. The FMLN leadership, along 
with their backers in Havana, in Moscow and (after July 1979) in Mana-
gua, concluded that the 1979 coup was testimony to their strength and 
redoubled their efforts to overthrow the Salvadoran regime. 
An important part of their effort was to discredit the junta by deny-
ing its democratic credentials. Propaganda from Moscow and Havana 
consistently referred to the government in San Salvador as a "military 
dictatorship:' as though there had been no change at all in October. It 
was this characterization of the Salvadoran government that dominated 
American newspaper accounts of events in the country well into 1980. 
As the visibility of the civilian President Duarte increased the American 
media took to describing the government as "military-dominated." Both 
designations had the effect of making Americans reluctant to support the 
anti-Communist side. 
The Salvadoran government did little to help its own cause. Trans-
forming the Salvadoran military from an instrument of repression for 
a tiny governing elite, which had been its role for decades, into a force 
capable of fighting a sophisticated and well-armed guerrilla insurgency 
was a slow and difficult task. It was made all the more difficult by the 
tenacity of corrupt generals who enriched themselves while refusing to 
take the field against the guerrillas. Even senior officers who were not 
corrupt were unused to the rigors of a full-scale guerrilla war. (Frustrated 
U.S. military advisors would complain about the "nine-to-five" mentality 
of the Salvadoran military.) 
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Also contributing to the cause of the guerrillas were stunning 
human rights outrages attributed to the military. On March 24, 1980, 
the archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero, was gunned down while 
in the act of saying Mass. Romero had been critical of both the Salva-
doran government and the FMLN, but since his assassins wore military 
uniforms, the crime was generally attributed to the army. In December, 
four American church women, who had been working with Salvadoran 
peasants opposed to the junta, were raped and murdered. Again, both 
sides had a motive for killing the women, but the evidence linking the 
murders to members of the military was stronger. 
While President Duarte condemned these actions and promised 
swift justice to the guilty, he seemed powerless to even insure that the 
crimes would be investigated, let alone insure punishment for the guilty. 
Throughout 1979 and 1980, civilian deaths in EI Salvador's civil war 
mounted. Death squad became the term commonly used for groups of 
off-duty military officers and other disgruntled right-wing Salvadorans 
who killed with impunity. The spectacle of a Salvadoran military unwi1l-
ing to face armed insurgents, but willing to kill labor leaders, teachers, 
nuns, and social workers fanned the flames of Marxist revolution in the 
country and insured that the FMLN would have a strong base of support 
in the United States. 
Preparing for Reagan 
Meanwhile, the cooperation of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua made ship-
ment of arms and material to the FMLN easier, and the guerrillas made 
significant advances in 1979 and 1980. The Carter administration respond-
ed to the near-crisis situation in the country with substantial military and 
economic assistance and increasingly strong statements of support for 
President Duarte. With the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980, 
the FMLN foresaw a much firmer U.S. response to its challenge to the 
pro-American Salvadoran government. The FMLN leadership decided to 
present the incoming anti-Communist president with a fait accompli. On 
January 10, 1981, the FMLN launched what it called its "Final Offensive" 
to overthrow the civilian-military junta. It did so with the full and vocal 
support of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. The latter's support prompted the 
Cart~r administration to suspend economic assistance to Nicaragua on 
January 17, 1981. 
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Thus, Ronald Reagan inherited a Central America already in severe 
turmoil. From the day that Reagan announced for president, to the day 
he took office, Nicaragua had gone from being a staunch American ally 
to being an even more staunch ally of Cuba and the Soviet Union. EI 
Salvador changed from a stable, if not terribly valuable, American ally to 
a nation under siege from a Communist insurgency that was at least as 
radical as the Sandinistas. Both Guatemala and Honduras faced the har-
rowing choice between right-wing governments and left-wing insurgen-
cies. Grenada, situated near the southeastern entry point of the Caribbean 
Sea, was also a Soviet ally. 
And in the middle of 1980, in the midst of the Iranian hostage 
crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, spreading leftist revolution in 
Central America and southern Africa, and double-digit inflation and gas 
lines, Fidel Castro unleashed a terrifying new weapon in his ongoing war 
with the United States. On April 22, Castro opened the port of Mariel to 
anyone desiring to leave the country. Within days, a flood of refugees was 
headed toward south Florida. Eventually, 120,000 Cubans would enter the 
United States. Even under the best of circumstances, such a sudden flood 
of refugees would have had staggering consequences for the communities 
bearing the brunt of the human tide. 
But in addition to the tens of thousands of honest and freedom-
loving Cubans who came to the United States, Castro sent thousands 
of violent criminals, mental patients, and terrorists. The dictator virtu-
ally emptied his prisons and insane asylums and sent the inmates to the 
unsuspecting, and totally unprepared, residents of south Florida. The 
impact was devastating and was made more so by the slow and hesitant 
response from the Carter administration. It was not until May 14 that 
Carter ordered a blockade of private boats from Cuba. The refugees con-
tinued to pour in until Castro dosed the port of Mariel in September. 
Breaks In the Clouds 
In spite of the bleak picture presented above, there were signs of hope in 
1980. By the time that Reagan was elected, it was plain that he would have 
other world leaders to work with who were every bit as anti-Communist 
as he was. In October 1978, Karol Wojtyla, a Polish cardinal, became Pope 
John Paul II. His election would sow the seeds of Communism's eventual 
implOSion in Eastern Europe. In May 1979, Conservative Party leader 
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Margaret Thatcher became prime minister of Great Britain. Like Reagan, 
she used harsh terms to criticize Soviet Communism, and she foreshad-
owed in England the orthodox capitalist reform that Reagan brought to 
the United States. 
There were also signs of weakness in the U.S.S.R. Given the aggres-
siveness and seeming confidence of the Soviet Union in 1980, it was pos-
sible to ignore the glaring weaknesses that were beginning to become 
obvious in that country. In 1981, President Reagan received a top-secret 
CIA assessment of the Soviet Union (a summary that I saw when I worked 
in the White House in 1984). The document described appalling con-
ditions in the Soviet Union, including rampant alcoholism and sharply 
rising abortion rates. Alone among industrialized countries, Soviet citi-
zens in 1981 actually had a declining life expectancy. Food shortages and 
long lines were becoming endemic. Shortages of medical supplies were so 
severe that hypodermic needles were delivered to hospitals with instruc-
tions for sharpening and derusting. 
It is possible that the very seriousness of the problems the Soviets 
faced in the late 1970s and 1980s prompted their leaders to take such 
enormous risks as the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was by 
no means doomed in 1981. While it managed to hide many of its weak-
nesses, its aggression and adventurism were very real. The Soviet leaders 
worked to provoke a crisis in the United States before their country's own 
internal crises overwhelmed them. 
As he prepared to take the Oath of Office, President-elect Ronald 
Reagan could barely look at a globe without seeing an area of crisis for the 
United States or an area in which the country appeared to be in retreat. 
In his autobiography, Reagan described his first night in the White House: 
"I peeked into the Oval Office as its official occupant for the first time. 
I felt a weight come down on my shoulders, and I said a prayer asking 
God's help in my new job:' Certainly few in Latin America doubted that 
he would need the help of the Almighty to tackle the challenges awaiting 
him in America's own hemisphere. 
And Reagan would face two further challenges, which I will describe 
in the next chapter. First, Reagan would have to overcome daunting 
domestic obstacles to creating a strong anti-Soviet foreign policy. These 
would include a weakened military and devastating economic problems. 
Even more discouraging was the reluctance of many Americans to criticize 
the Soviet Union, or even to use the word Communism. Before Reagan 
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could act in Central America, he would have to reconquer the language 
of international relations. 
The second challenge would be almost as difficult. For Reagan to 
impose his vision of a foreign policy based on freedom on his enemies, 
he would first have to impose that vision on much of the foreign policy 
bureaucracy of the United States. Throughout his eight years in the White 
House, Reagan faced not only the possibility of war outside the United 
States but also the daily reality of war within his own administration. 
2 
Infighting 
Wars Over u.s. Foreign Policy 
History is a river that may take us as it will. But we have the 
power to navigate, to choose direction, and to make our passage 
together. 
-Ronald Reagan 
Not only an unenviable international situation, but also unprecedented 
problems at home greeted Ronald Reagan when he became president. 
These included economic problems and problems of national morale. Rea-
gan came to the presidency determined to make sweeping changes in the 
basic direction of both the domestic and foreign policies of the United 
States. With regard to foreign policy, Reagan faced practical difficulties 
related to making even minor changes, let alone the radical changes that 
he had in mind. Among his tasks would be to change the institutional 
culture of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. 
It would take enormous determination for Reagan to press on with 
his agenda for his administration. It would also take focus, since not even 
the most determined president can do everything at once. The crisis in 
Central America was thrust onto Reagan's shoulders in his first days in 
office, and he decided that the region would be the first step in achieving 
his global foreign policy goals. It was here, as Secretary of State Alexan-
der Haig stated, that Reagan would "draw a line in the sand." The new 
president would soon discover, if he did not know already, that he would 
have to draw some lines in the sand in Washington as well. 
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Blazing a New Path 
In the early 1980s, American intellectuals believed, almost without excep-
tion, that the Soviet Union would continue to exist indefinitely and might 
even become more powerful than the United States. Harvard historian 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. was apparently referring to Reagan when he said 
in 1982 that "those in the United States who think the Soviet Union is on 
the verge of economic and social collapse, ready with one small push to 
go over the brink, are wishful thinkers who are only kidding themselves:' 
Another Ivy League expert stated, even more boldly, "The Soviet Union 
is not now, nor will it be during the next decade, in the throes of a true 
systematic crisis:' 
Economist John Kenneth Galbraith asserted as late as 1984 that "the 
Soviet system has made great material progress in recent years.. . . The 
Russian system succeeds because, in contrast with the Western industrial 
economies, it makes full use of its manpower:' MIT professor of econom-
ics Lester Thurow asked in 1982, "Can economic command significantly 
compress and accelerate the growth process? The remarkable performance 
of the Soviet Union suggests that it can:' (Neither expert mentioned that 
Soviet hospitals were sharpening hypodermic needles for reuse.) 
By 1980, to call someone a "Communist:' even someone in the 
Soviet Politburo, was considered, at best, behind the times. According to 
MIT's Paul Samuelson, to believe that Communism made people unhappy 
was "vulgar:' To warn about the dangers of Communist subversion was 
to invite scorn and derision. In 1979, during all the question-and-answer 
sessions President Carter had with the media, he got exactly six questions 
from journalists that began with the assumption that the Soviet Union 
was an enemy. Carter himself often minimized the Soviet threat. He told 
graduates at Notre Dame in 1977, "[W]e are now free of that inordinate 
fear of communism:' As late as 1979, on an occasion when he was asked 
if the Soviets sought world domination, Carter responded, "I don't have 
any inclination to condemn the Soviets as a people, or even as a govern-
ment:' It was only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that Carter 
admitted he "no longer trust[ed]" Leonid Brezhnev. 
Thus, among Reagan's other tasks would be the reintroduction of 
the words Communist and Communism into American political parlance 
and to turn these words back into pejoratives. Reagan believed that some 
Americans needed to be reminded that the U.S.S.R. was, in fact, an enemy 
of the United States, and he took care to do so early in his administration, 
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long before his famous "evil empire" comment in 1983. 
In his first news conference, Reagan was asked for his assessment 
of the Soviets' global intentions. His headline-making answer was, "[The 
Soviets) have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they 
recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto 
themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to 
attain that:' Among the first official documents to come from his admin-
istration was a State and Defense Department document titled, "Com-
munist Support for Subversion in Central America:' 
Reagan made clear not only his hostility toward Soviet Communism 
but also his future plans for it. In May 1981, Reagan told the graduates 
of Notre Dame, "The years ahead are great ones for this country, for the 
cause of freedom and the spread of civilization. The West won't contain 
communism, it will transcend communism. It won't bother to dismiss or 
denounce it; it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history 
whose last pages are even now being written:' 
At the time, most commentators assumed that Reagan's bellicose 
comment at South Bend was more of an empty applause line than a 
concrete statement of policy. In so assuming, the commentators missed 
the true Significance of the new President's statement. Reagan was not just 
playing to the crowd; he was announcing his Administration's rejection 
of thirty-five years of American foreign policy, centered on the "contain-
ment" of the Soviet Union. Had Reagan understood the obstacles that he 
and his allies in his administration would have to overcome in Washing-
ton to bring about such a fundamental change in foreign poliCY, the task 
might have threatened even his eternal optimism. 
How Foreign Policy Is Made 
Political pundits, textbook authors, and, to a large degree, political leaders 
themselves have given Americans an inaccurate picture of where foreign 
policy comes from. With most public documents on U.S. foreign policy 
published over the signature of either the president or the secretary of 
state, one can easily be misled into thinking first, that the president and 
secretary of state compose all the documents that they sign; and second, 
that these documents, and the policies that they contain, are part of a 
large, overarching, and consistent design. 
One of the more misleading habits of commentators on U.S. foreign 
policy is their use of the pronouns we, us, or our when they speak or 
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write about U.S. foreign policy. Examples include comments such as, "We 
tried to overthrow Castro with the Bay of Pigs invasion;' or "It was only 
when Salvador Allende threatened to nationalize our copper companies 
that we decided to overthrow him;' or "Our problem with Saddam Hus-
sein had more to do with oil than with weapons of mass destruction:' 
Closely related to this view is the expectation that U.S. foreign policy, from 
top to bottom, changes with each change in the U.S. presidency and that 
there will be particularly sweeping changes if a president from a different 
political party is inaugurated. This view ignores the larger percentage of 
American foreign policy that continues unchanged from one administra-
tion to the next. 
Many textbooks on U.S. foreign policy contain brief acknowledg-
ments that there is, in fact, continuity in the policy but are then divided 
into chapters titled after presidents. In some cases, authors are so com-
mitted to praising or blaming administrations for everything that happens 
on their watch, they ascribe things to presidents who have not yet taken 
office. Writing about El Salvador, for example, one author attributed the 
murder of left-leaning Archbishop Oscar Romero to the hard-line anti-
Communist rhetoric of the Reagan administration, conveniently forgetting 
that the archbishop was killed months before Reagan was even elected. 
While such retromonarchical treatments are becoming less usual, 
those that still exist downplay the vital role that permanent members of 
the foreign policy elite play, especially entry- to middle-level bureaucrats. 
Put differently, administration-based analyses assume that all elements of 
U.S. foreign policy receive the same amount of attention and input from 
senior policy makers, such as the president or secretary of state, and that 
the marching orders from the top are always consistent. 
Given their basic assumption about the source of U.S. foreign policy 
decisions, analysts who focus on administrations are hard put to explain 
inconsistency or incoherence in foreign policy. They take refuge in the 
idea that foreign policy makers are sometimes irrational, not terribly 
bright, or simply evil. Former senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), for 
example, said of Latin America: "We cannot successfully advance the 
cause of popular democracy and at the same time align ourselves with 
corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be try-
ing to do . . . [T]he approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if 
consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolu-
tions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies 
of the hemisphere:' 
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Speaking more boldly, foreign policy expert Hans Morgenthau sug-
gested that focusing on the ideology of Communism during the Cold War, 
"strengthen [edl another pathological tendency, which is the refusal to 
acknowledge in thought, and cope effectively with, a threatening reality:' 
This is almost a textbook definition of irrationality: Townsend Hoppes ana-
lyzed the U.S. commitment in Vietnam by asking how so many intelligent, 
experienced, and humane men in government could have failed to under-
stand the "immorality" of the Vietnam intervention and the "cancerous 
division" it had created in America. His answer, for a time the prevailing 
view, was that policy makers were emotionally dominated by the "cold 
war syndrome and its ramified legacy:' 
For many foreign policy experts, irrationality and evil as explana-
tions for inconsistency are preferred over the possibility that there might 
be more than one U.S. foreign policy at any given time. Even the portrait 
of U.S. policy makers as stupid or irrational still requires the assumption 
that there are a small number of policy makers. In other words, if there 
are in fact large numbers of people who make foreign policy, and the 
foreign policy that they make is stupid or irrational, then they must all 
be stupid or irrational in the same way, at the same time. 
Some experts do acknowledge the many-headed nature of U.S. 
foreign policy by focusing on the bureaucratic process that begets for-
eign policy. Stephen D. Cohen, for example, writes that in economic 
matters, foreign policy "emanates not from a centralized, objective deci-
sion maker, but from a conglomerate of large organizations and political 
actors with different missions, different perceptions, and different priori-
ties. . . . More often than not, policy is determined by a committee-
bred consensus that everyone can live with." Such analyses are closer to 
the truth, but these also have a drawback: where the retromonarchist 
assumes that the same people make every foreign policy decision, the 
process analyst is too prone to assuming that no one is in charge. 
The truth lies between the two extremes. Presidents, national secu-
rity advisors, secretaries of state, and other top officials do have a major 
role in creating and directing U.S. foreign policy. However, they are not 
the only important players. Reagan, like his predecessors, had to learn 
that he had far less control over foreign policy makers in his adminis-
tration than he might have expected. Most men and women who create 
the foreign policy of the United States are not subject to the will of the 
preSident. This includes foreign service officers (FSOs), who staff nearly all 
the entry- and middle-level staff positions at the State Department. FSOs, 
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like most civil servants, are protected by law from dismissal, except "for 
cause:' This phrase has come to mean that, short of embezzling public 
funds, exhibiting gross incompetence, or committing outright treason, 
FSOs cannot be fired. Even to discipline a foreign service officer by, for 
example, transferring him or her to an undesirable overseas post is a dif-
ficult process steeped in time-consuming legal requirements. 
The same is true of all but a small percentage of analysts and foreign 
policy makers in the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, and the other 
executive branch agencies that include people who make foreign policy. 
(Most Americans would probably be surprised to learn that there is an 
office for foreign policy in the Department of the Interior.) The president 
has even less sway over members of Congress and their staff members, 
who, by drafting legislation, also play a Vitally important role in making 
foreign policy. 
In fact, there are thousands of government officials who make 
U.S. foreign policy. Lower level officials can usually make policy with-
out interference, or even supervision, from their nominal superiors in 
the Cabinet. By necessity, preSidents and Cabinet members deal with 
problems with the greatest and most immediate import. They leave the 
(supposedly) noncritical policy-making decisions to the FSOs and other 
bureaucrats. With this reality in mind, it is not remarkable that there are 
inconsistencies and contradictions in U.S. foreign policy; what is remark-
able is that there is any consistency at all. Yet there is consistency, because 
most of the thousands of anonymous foreign policy makers do have a 
common world view. 
Many Goals, Few Tools 
Government officials also have a common daily challenge: multitasking. 
A surprisingly large number of analyses and explanations of U.S. foreign 
policy revolve around the notion that a Single action can be linked to a 
Single goal. For example, some of Reagan's critics accused him of support-
ing the Salvadoran government against the guerrillas to please American 
business interests in EI Salvador. Some of his critics said that he tried to 
overthrow the Sandinistas to send a signal to the Soviet Union. Still others 
said that Reagan supported democracy in Honduras or Guatemala only 
to spread U.S. influence in those countries. 
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Such comments are examples of how analysts can be exactly right, 
and absolutely wrong, at the same time. Reagan was trying to make El 
Salvador friendlier to American businesses, he was trying to communi-
cate with the Soviet leadership with his actions in Nicaragua, and he did 
hope that democracy in Central America would result in more Amer-
ican influence there. However, to suggest that Reagan was taking actions 
in Central America, or indeed anywhere in the world, for one reason, 
and for only one reason, no matter what the reason, is to fundamentally 
misunderstand how foreign policy is made. Single-purpose analyses also 
misunderstand the much greater challenge of redirecting foreign policy, 
as Reagan desired to do. 
Foreign policy makers, from the El Salvador desk officer up to the 
president of the United States of America, never do anything for just one 
reason. Presidential libraries are filled with memos to presidents and other 
senior policy makers, trying to tell them how to achieve several goals 
with the same action. Indeed, for a middle-level policy maker, the most 
certain way to get a senior policy maker to take advice is to convince 
one's superior that he or she will accomplish several goals by doing so. 
Many people without firsthand experience in government do not 
realize just how opportunistic people in the foreign policy bureaucracy 
tend to be. Where the average television news viewer may see a guerrilla 
war in El Salvador, a foreign policy bureaucrat may see an opportunity 
to use the crisis in El Salvador to advance foreign policy goals in Angola, 
France, and the Soviet Union, all at the same time. 
These are just the overseas arenas of activity, most likely to be seen 
by a foreign policy professional. A political appointee higher up the lad-
der, or an elected official, such as a senator or a president, looking at the 
same guerrilla war in El Salvador, will see opportunities and/or dangers 
in even more areas. A senator, like a foreign service officer, sees the links 
between El Salvador and Angola, France and the Soviet Union, but the 
senator also sees ways to use events in El Salvador to advance a bill on 
U.S. farm supports or to get a promise from the White House in return 
for an upcoming vote on military aid to El Salvador. The senator may 
remember that he or she has a constituent who is an expert on Latin 
America and see a way to do that constituent a favor. For presidents, the 
possible linkages are even more numerous. 
For foreign policy makers, there are always far more dangers and 
opportunities than there is power to deal with all of them. The gap between 
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what a president, senator, secretary of state or entry-level State Depart-
ment official would like to accomplish with any given opportunity, and 
what he or she has the power to actually accomplish, is usually quite wide. 
Under those circumstances, it is preferable, in fact it is absolutely 
necessary, to accomplish several goals, with the same effort, at the same 
time. Thus, analyses of US. foreign policy that rest on the assumption 
that decision makers have a single, isolated goal in mind when creating 
foreign policy are completely unrealistic. A secret 1979 memo to Carter on 
the meeting of the Policy Review Committee illustrates the determination 
to accomplish several goals at once. The group had discussed Nicaragua's 
dictator Anastasio Somoza. The memo summarized the committee's con-
clusion: "Steps should be taken to signal our displeasure with Somoza's 
intransigence and to get some distance between us, but without losing 
the possibility of influencing him in the future:' Four days later, the same 
group met again and added "maintaining credibility with [Venezuelan] 
President [Carlos Andres] Perez" to the list of goals. A June 1979 secret 
memo to the secretary of state listed no fewer than nine "US. Objectives 
toward Central America:' 
Because of the myriad goals and objectives of foreign policy makers, 
they possess a common desire to extend their control over events around 
the world. The memo quoted above shows the perceived need in the for-
eign policy establishment to be able to influence, if not control, foreign 
governments to insure that the United States gets its way. 
Foreign Aid as a Tool 
Standing in the way of this desire for control is the fact that the tools 
with which policy makers can pursue their goals in foreign policy are also 
more limited than even most presidents expect they will be before tak-
ing office. The case of foreign aid is a useful case in point, and one that 
played a major role in US. foreign policy toward Central America during 
the Reagan years. It is theoretically possible to use foreign aid money as 
a carrot or stick to accomplish various kinds of foreign policy goals, but 
the reality is far more complicated. 
First, the foreign aid budget of the United States of America in the 
1980s totaled less than $5 billion per year, or less than 3 percent of the 
total budget of the United States. Of that amount, nearly half went to two 
countries, Egypt and Israel, as the result of promises made to their leaders 
at the 1978 Camp David meetings. Getting Congress to raise the amount 
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of foreign aid in the budget is a difficult task under any circumstances. 
Support for increases in foreign aid among Americans is limited, unless 
it is targeted to a specific, and well-publicized, humanitarian need. 
The second obstacle to the efficient use of foreign aid as a foreign 
policy tool is earmarking. This is reserving foreign aid by law for certain 
uses, making it not transferable to other uses. Only a small percentage of 
the small foreign aid budget is discretionary, and this percentage shrank 
during the Reagan years. The third obstacle to using foreign aid to increase 
the influence of the United States overseas is precommitment. Managers of 
foreign aid, both in the Congress and in the Executive Branch, are wary of 
dispensing large amounts of money to foreign governments without having 
some security that the money will not be misused. Since there is no effec-
tive way to insure the proper use of American aid once it is disbursed, most 
U.S. aid packages feature multiyear disbursements, with each year's money 
dependent on the recipient's good behavior (however defined) during the 
previous year. Discussions of foreign aid in Washington make frequent use 
of the phrase money in the pipeline. This phrase refers to aid that has been 
appropriated by Congress but not yet given to the recipient. 
The fourth obstacle is the fact that the foreign aid "tool" is not 
only small and limited; it is also clumsy. While there are times when the 
threat to curtail aid, or the promise to increase aid, can induce a foreign 
leader to obey commands from the U.S. government, such times are far 
more rare than those without foreign policy experience might think. The 
threat to cut off U.S. aid is only useful until the threat actually has to 
be fulfilled. Once the U.S. government has cut off aid, it can no . longer 
be used as leverage to get a desired outcome. If an aid cut-off does not 
bring the desired outcome, about the only option policy makers have is 
to offer to restore aid. 
Moreover, the leaders of most U.S. aid recipients know that they 
would not be receiving aid in the first place if their country were not 
important to the United States. These leaders also know that only the 
most significant and blatant departures from U.S. government wishes are 
likely to make decision makers consider cancelling aid. As one expert on 
foreign aid put it, for American diplomats, relations with any given foreign 
country are either improving or deteriorating. Either way, the diplomats 
are likely to think that more foreign aid is the proper response. 
Foreign aid from the United States government is not the only 
potential source of American economic leverage. U.S. officials hold impor-
tant positions at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
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and other multilateral lending institutions. In addition, private banks in 
the United States are in the habit of following the advice of U.S. govern-
ment officials before making loans to foreign governments. In some cir-
cumstances, when it is not possible to reduce or cut off direct American 
aid, foreign policy bureaucrats may be able to threaten punitive action 
connected with a country's foreign debt. 
In some cases, Central American nations did not have much foreign 
debt and therefore did not have to fear American officials interfering 
with their financial relationships. Evidence that U.S. officials found this 
situation objectionable is contained in a secret April 1982 Memorandum 
of Conversation between a Treasury Department official and the finance 
minister of Guatemala. According to the memo, Treasury's director of 
the Office of Developing Nations pressured the Guatemalan government 
to borrow more money from IMF. "Given its resource base:' the official 
recalled, "Guatemala had a potential for borrowing on a larger scale:' 
Despite the limitations of foreign aid as a foreign policy tool, it is 
the preferred method of policy makers to get their way in foreign affairs. 
Some diplomatic methods are easier to use, such as simple persuasion, but 
they are seen as even less effective than raising or lowering the amount 
of foreign aid. Other methods, such as bribery, assassination, sanctions, 
blockades, or even military force, can be more effective, at least in the 
short term, but they bring huge risks and complications. 
Thus, when Reagan confronted the deepening crisis in Central 
America when he took office, he did so with a rather limited number of 
tools at his disposal. Reagan was not daunted by this situation, since he 
did not discount the value of persuasion in dealing with political oppo-
nents. Drawing on his experience as a labor union president, a "pitch-
man" for General Electric, and a California governor, Reagan came to the 
preSidency with enormous (his critics would say unfounded) confidence 
in his ability to successfully negotiate with anyone. 
Reagan also had a heart-felt faith that political liberty and economic 
success were universally held aspirations for men and women around the 
world. Most people, Reagan believed, want to be free and prosperous. 
The barriers to these goals were leaders who were either ignorant of the 
benefits of freedom or maliciously standing in the way of freedom. Only 
with the second group might force be needed. Reagan truly believed that 
most people, in most of the world, under most circumstances, would 
be natural allies in his crusade for liberation. Reagan soon learned that, 
in this regard, he differed from many people in the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment. 
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A Preference for "Stability" and a Desire for "Leverage" 
Most us. foreign policy bureaucrats are well educated in the academic 
theories of us. foreign policy. Most would have read, for example, Nor-
man Graebner's analysis of twentieth-century US. foreign policy, which 
begins with the comment: "Viewing the world from a pinnacle, [American 
scholars and statesmen] had agreed long before 1914 that the nation's 
favored position required above all a high degree of international stability." 
More recently, Robert Tucker summarized U.S. foreign policy this way: 
"For a period of well over half a century American statesmen effectively 
pursued an expansionist strategy aimed at 'stabilizing the world in a pro-
American equilibrium' and did so on the whole using methods congenial 
to American power and interests:' 
Former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kiss-
inger was a member of the "realist" school of international theory, and he 
was most explicit in his preference for stability. Writing before he held a 
government position, Kissinger said: "The greatest need of the contem-
porary international system is an agreed concept of order. . . . A new 
concept of international order is essential; without it stability will prove 
elusive:' That stability is desirable seems self-evident to Kissinger. In the 
same essay, he underlines the point: "A mature conception of our interest 
in the world would obviously take into account the widespread interest 
in stability:' 
Similar, representative statements by other US. secretaries of state 
are strong evidence of the existence and durability of US. foreign policy 
makers' preference for stability in international affairs. While "stability" 
can mean a number of different things, for US. foreign policy bureau-
crats, it almost always refers to the ability of US. policymakers to affect 
outcomes, using "leverage:' If one accepts the idea that US. officials will, 
and should, pursue Amerka's self-interest and assumes that the leaders 
of other countries may not be inclined to pursue America's interest with 
equal enthusiasm, it naturally follows that US. officials will, and should, 
apply various forms of pressure to get their way. 
Kissinger considered the 1970s' oil shocks to be strong evidence 
of the potentially dangerous divergence of interests between the United 
States and the OPEC nations. He said in 1977: "[F]or the first time in our 
history, a small group of nations controlling a scarce resource could over 
time be tempted to pressure us into foreign policy decisions not dictated 
by our national interest." Later, he added: "Our prosperity is to some 
extent hostage to the decisions on raw materials, prices and investment 
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in distant countries whose purposes are not necessarily compatible with 
ours:' 
The international system was complicated, Kissinger insisted, by the 
emergence of new nations that were not part of the traditional interna-
tional political system. "Today;' he wrote in 1969, "statesmen face the 
unprecedented problem of formulating policy for well over a hundred 
countries. Every nation, no matter how insignificant (sic), participates 
in international affairs:' Worse, emerging nations see the world so dif-
ferently, as to make diplomacy almost impossible. Kissinger warned, ''A 
similar outlook about aims and methods eases the tasks of diplomacy-it 
may even be a precondition for it. In the absence of such a consensus, 
diplomats can still meet, but they lose the ability to persuade:' 
John Lewis Gaddis spoke in graver (and more condescending) terms 
about the likely source of disruption of "the existing distribution of pow-
er" in the 1980s. It was not the Soviets whom American officials should 
fear, Gaddis insisted. "It is, rather, a small and poorly understood group 
of states, primitive, by most standards, in their economic development, 
medieval in their subordination of state and even multi state interests to 
the dictates of religion, unsophisticated in their knowledge of the outside 
world and for the most part heedless of the effects of their actions upon 
it, and yet in a position. . . to bring the West to a grinding halt." 
In the view of the leading academic voices on US. foreign policy, 
when Americans have to deal with such "primitive; "medieval;' and "unso-
phisticated" leaders, who may control vital natural resources, or command 
strategic geographic locations, or be in a position to aid enemies of the US., 
American foreign policy makers face the choice of either applying pressure 
or seeing vital US. interests sacrificed. Most FSOs agree that these are the 
only choices and that the second does not merit serious consideration. 
The desire for leverage is also connected to the multiple objectives 
that foreign policy makers are pursuing at any given time. When there are 
many goals, and limited tools to achieve them, policy makers will natu-
rally wish to be able to give orders and not to waste time with persuasion. 
Leveraged Allies and Natural Allies 
Not all members of the foreign policy elite accept the Kissinger-Morgen-
thau realist view that conflict is endemic to international relations and 
that the quest for more power is inescapable. Some members of the elite 
adhere to the "idealist" tradition, harking back to President Woodrow 
infighting I 31 
Wilson. The WWI president insisted upon the existence of universally 
applicable moral principles, derived from divine sources. Wilson rejected 
the permanence of conflict, strife, and warfare in international politics. He 
firmly believed in the necessity and usefulness of a powerful international 
organization to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggressors. Such interna-
tional criminals would appear only rarely, in Wilson's view, and most of 
those who appeared would be deterred by "world opinion:' given voice 
and strength by the League of Nations. 
But Wilson had one element in common with Kissinger: the 
assumption that the United States would occasionally have to use power 
(or leverage) to achieve desired outcomes. The difference between the fol-
lowers of Wilson and Kissinger had to do with when the U.S. government 
should use power, what kind of power ought to be used, and whether 
such exercises of power would be constant or sporadic. Put differently, 
both idealists and realists believe that great powers, however defined, will 
have to use some kind of coercion to get their way. 
In the early Cold War policies of the top decision makers in the 
Truman administration, realism was the theory of choice, and the theory 
was applied to the goal of containing the Soviet Union. But critics of the 
realist point of view still saw the desirability of American leverage over 
developing countries, for different reasons. Senator J. William Fulbright 
(D-AR), for example, lauded President Lyndon Johnson for comparing 
John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress with his own "enlightened pro-
gram for a Great Society at home:' Fulbright added that the "real friends" 
of America, in Latin America at least, were "people of the democratic left:' 
Fulbright had no problem with intervention, or with the use of leverage, 
as long as it was on behalf of "our real friends" in Latin America. 
What both Wilsonian idealists and Kissingerian realists seem to fear 
was the possibility of other countries becoming impervious to American 
applications of leverage. For foreign policy bureaucrats, such indepen-
dence of action on the part of foreign leaders is to be avoided. Early in 
the Carter administration, Robert A. Pastor, who handled Latin American 
affairs for the National Security Council, lamented recent trends in Latin 
America that most Americans, had they known about them, would have 
regarded as positive. In a confidential March 14, 1977, memo to Zbig-
niew Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "[R)elatively rapid economic development 
and increasingly institutionalized governments have made [Latin Ameri-
can countries) more resistant to foreign influence, particularly North 
American influence." 
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Viron Vaky, Carter's assistant secretary of state for Latin America, 
was quoted in an October 1979 secret memo to Brzezinski as saying the 
us. government "should adopt the Cubans' strategy [in EI Salvador): 
identify a group and give them whatever is necessary to seize power:' 
Some US. officials sought leverage over larger and more powerful states 
as well. In July 1986, Elliot Abrams, Vaky's successor at state, suggested to 
Secretary of State George Shultz that the US. government should "indi-
rectly influence the selection of a successor to [Mexican president Miguel) 
de la Madrid who will continue reforms, cooperate with the US., and 
maintain stability:' 
Leverage over the leaders of other countries is useful for another 
reason. Members of the US. foreign policy bureaucracy, for the most part, 
prefer to face international crises with partners, in order to share the costs 
(and risks) of exercising power in international relations. On the surface, 
this would seem to contradict the contention that foreign policy elites 
fundamentally distrust foreign leaders and prefer coercion to persuasion. 
In fact, there is no contradiction. Partnerships do not threaten American 
hegemony if the partners are clearly subordinate partners. Put differently, 
there is more "stability" in relationships in which "allies" have little or no 
choice but to follow America's lead. Such nations may be referred to as 
"leveraged allies:' 
The desire for stability and leverage is dominant in the foreign policy 
bureaucracy, but there are members of that bureaucracy with an oppos-
ing view. Some officials in the State Department, the CIA, or elsewhere 
believe, as Reagan did, that coercion was not necessarily a precondition of 
cooperation in US. overseas activities. Reagan's statements on the impor-
tance of democracy seemed to be motivated not only by an ideological 
preference for self-government but also by a confidence that democratic 
nations will almost invariably be the natural and reliable allies of the 
United States. With enough democratic nations in the world, the United 
States will have a selection of potential allies for any given crisis. Provided 
that the United States adequately maintains its own defense capability, it 
will be able to protect its interests with a relatively small number of allies. 
Allies who follow America's lead because of a common perception 
of interests and goals, which Reagan believed would usually happen with 
democracies, are more valuable than allies who follow out of the fear of 
US. "leverage:' Moreover, leverage only works on nations that need Amer-
ican assistance in some form or another. Reagan's frequently stated desire 
for "prosperous" democracies had a double meaning. On the one hand, 
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Reagan was expressing the ideological view that democracy will naturally 
and inevitably lead to economic prosperity (at least compared to what 
is possible under more repressive regimes). On the other hand, Reagan 
believed that prosperous nations, which can contribute more resources to 
a joint effort, are more helpful allies than dependent nations, even if the 
latter are more easily coerced into cooperation. 
Loving the Cold War 
For foreign policy elites who prefer leveraged allies to natural allies, Rea-
gan's stated desire to end the Cold War was chillingly threatening. His 
insistence upon that desire guaranteed bloody bureaucratic warfare in 
the agencies that made foreign policy. (Such warfare will be the recur-
ring subplot of all the chapters that follow.) Removing the menace of 
Soviet subversion threatened to also remove a major source of leverage 
for American policy makers. 
Nicaragua makes an excellent case in point. Since the 1930s, the 
Somoza family and its adherents had argued that right-wing dictatorship, 
backed up with an alliance with the U.S. government, was the country's 
only protection against Communist subversion. Indeed, the Somozas 
often gave the impression that Nicaragua was a prime target of the Soviet 
Politburo. The first Somoza dictator was successful enough in convincing 
U.S. policy makers of the same thing that Franklin Roosevelt once report-
edly described him as: "a son of a bitch, but he's OUR son of a bitch." 
As leveraged allies, the Somoza dictators were perfect. The dictator-
ship had been installed with the assistance of U.S. officials, which meant 
that none of the Somozas ever had a high level of popular support in 
Nicaragua. Instead, the Somozas required American support to remain 
in power. This is the very definition of leverage. The Somozas insured 
that they would continue to depend" on U.S. government assistance by 
pursuing economic policies that prevented Nicaragua from making real 
economic progress. The combination of Somoza cronyism, corruption, 
and incompetence placed heavy shackles on the Nicaraguan economy. 
The lack of economic progress, at the same time, guaranteed that 
there would always be a sizable percentage of Nicaraguans ready and 
willing to listen to Marxist rhetoric. It was just a matter of time before a 
Communist insurgency took root in the country, and while the Somoza 
dictatorship could contain a strictly home-grown revolutionary move-
ment indefinitely, it would need additional American support to fend off 
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serious intervention from the Soviet Union or Cuba. Moreover, the threat 
of outside Communist intervention made some Nicaraguans acquiesce in 
the Somoza dictatorship, even Nicaraguans who would otherwise insist 
on a free society and a free economy. 
Absent the Soviet threat, neither democratically inclined Nicara-
guans nor human-rights-minded North Americans would have any incen-
tive to tolerate a dictatorship. For Somoza, this would mean the loss of 
his bargaining position with U.S. officials. For those officials, accustomed 
to having leverage available if needed to influence Somoza's actions, the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat could mean the end of their lever-
age. Absent the Soviet threat, it would no longer be possible to persuade 
human rights organizations or concerned members of Congress that 
Somoza was necessary to U.S. national security and in need of American 
funds. Without those funds at their disposal, the leverage of U.S. officials 
would disappear. 
Without holding the presidency, the Somoza clan would no longer 
be able to manage the country's economic policy, which it did to its own 
benefit, but to Nicaragua's detriment. Nicaragua in the 1970s was actually 
fairly well off, as developing countries go. The nation is not without natu-
ral resources, and, before the destruction of the civil war, and a decade 
of Sandinista economic incompetence, Nicaragua had a reasonably good 
infrastructure, a sizeable middle class of businesspeople, and a produc-
tive agricultural sector. Despite the Somozas, it was possible to envision a 
self-sufficient Nicaragua in the 1970s. Looking one step further, it is also 
possible to envision a strong Nicaraguan economy lifting up the other 
economies in the region, moving more U.S. aid recipients, such as Hon-
duras and Guatemala, toward self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency means no 
more need for foreign aid, which means no more leverage. It was this 
future that Pastor warned against in his 1977 memo to Brzezinski. 
Somoza was hardly alone in the world as a dictator leveraged by 
U.S. government support. He was not even alone in the region. Dozens 
of right-wing dictators used the threat of Communism, and the Cold War, 
as a method of staying in power and, simultaneously, of giving leverage to 
American officials. Reagan's crusade to end the Cold War was almost as 
large a threat to right-wing dictators as it was to left-wing dictators. Mini-
mally, it meant a sizeable disruption of long-established and mutually ben-
eficial relationships between dictators and U.S. foreign policy bureaucrats. 
However, reducing the threat of outside Communist intervention, 
replacing dictators with democratic leaders, and bolstering the econo-
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mies of developing nations all promised to create more natural allies for 
the United States. While the dominant preference in the foreign policy 
bureaucracy might have been for a dependent and leveraged Nicaragua 
under Somoza, it was at least possible to envision a democratic Nicaragua, 
with a growing economy, freely making common cause with the United 
States in the region. 
The Reagan administration was an unusually divided one. Moreover, 
its divisions were often out in the open, thanks to the propensity of officials 
to leak information to the media. Scholars and analysts have taken great 
pains to categorize and explain the multiplicity of voices emanating from 
the Reagan administration. Some analysts have focused on the conflicts 
between conservatives and liberals, between "hawks" and "doves;' between 
"true believers" and "moderates," between the State Department and the 
Defense Department, and between presidential appointees and perma-
nent bureaucrats. In the internal wars of the Reagan administration over 
Central America policy, it was the conflict between those who preferred 
leveraged allies and those who preferred natural allies that best explained 
the sometimes bewildering cacophony of voices from the administration. 
Reagan's Offensive 
It is not clear whether or not Reagan realized all of the forces he was 
challenging when he made his Notre Dame speech and followed it up 
with concrete actions to challenge the existence of the u.S.S.R. Except 
for one or two tantalizing hints, he makes no mention of this aspect 
of foreign policy making in his autobiography. Nevertheless, it is clear 
from the nature of the opposition Reagan faced from his own foreign 
policy bureaucracy, which will be detailed in the succeeding chapters, that 
not everyone in his administration supported his efforts to permanently 
weaken the Soviet Union. 
In spite of the widespread opposition it generated, inside and outside 
the administration, Reagan gradually unveiled a four-pronged attack on 
the Soviet Union during the first two years of his presidency. The details 
of his offensive have been much more fully treated elsewhere, so a brief 
summary will suffice, to show the pivotal role played by Reagan's policy 
for Central America. 
The first prong of the attack was rhetorical and psychological. It 
included statements such as the ones at Reagan's first news conference 
and at Notre Dame. Reagan continued this part of his attack by telling the 
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British Parliament in 1982: "It is the Soviet Union that runs against the 
tide of history. . . . [It is 1 the march of freedom and democracy which 
will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history as it has left other 
tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the 
people:' Most famously, he told the National Association of Evangelicals 
in 1983 that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire:' 
Like foreign policy makers, Reagan rarely did things for just one 
reason. Rhetoric of this kind was designed to threaten the Soviet Union, 
to reclaim the anti-Communist vocabulary that had fallen into disrepute, 
to assure his conservative supporters that he was unchanged by the presi-
dency, to get news coverage, and to signal his own bureaucracy that he 
would be the spokesman for his administration's foreign policy. 
Aggressive oratory was not the only part of Reagan's psychological 
offensive against the Soviet Union. Soon after taking office, Secretary of 
State Haig discontinued a long-standing privilege of the Soviet ambassa-
dor. Anatoly Dobrynin had been accustomed to entering the State Depart-
ment via a private entrance, thus avoiding the gauntlet of media that 
sometimes congregated at the Department's main entrance. Under Rea-
gan, the Soviet ambassador received the same treatment as other foreign 
representatives, which the Soviets interpreted as a denial of their special 
status as the only other superpower. This is exactly the psychological effect 
that Reagan and Haig desired. 
The second prong of Reagan's offensive was economic. The first ele-
ment of the economic attack was to deny the Soviets hard currency. Rea-
gan brought enormous pressure to bear on Western European countries 
to postpone or cancel work on a natural gas pipeline from the U.S.S.R. 
Reagan was determined enough to prevent the Soviets from profiting 
from the sale of natural gas that he was willing to put new strains on the 
NATO alliance. Reagan also ordered U.S. representatives at multi-national 
banking organizations to use whatever means possible to deny the Soviets 
aCcess to hard currency loans. 
The second part of the economic offensive was to create the condi-
tions for an economic boom in the United States. Strong, sustained expan-
sion of the American economy would, among other .things, provide the 
tax revenues necessary for a large buildup of American military forces. In 
fact, Reagan was committed to the military buildup regardless of the pace 
of economic growth. His critics would charge he was gambling, recklessly, 
that the Soviets would bankrupt themselves just before America did. By 
blocking the flow of hard currency, and compelling the Soviets to spend 
more and more money, Reagan was squeezing at both ends. 
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The final piece of the economic plan was to toughen the u.s. line on 
technology transfer to the U.S.S.R. The wherewithal for modernization of 
the Soviets' military hardware, not to mention the modernization of their 
civilian economy, came largely from the West. Defense Secretary Caspar 
Weinberger sought to pinch off this route to economic survival for the 
Soviet Union. Reagan's critics again charged he was acting contrary to 
American economic interests, by preventing American companies from 
doing high-technology business with the Soviets. 
The third prong of the offensive was technological. As a 1981 CIA 
assessment showed, the Soviet economy was in serious trouble, and its 
social indicators were appalling. By 1981, the Soviet Union was barely able 
to continue its subsidy to Fidel Castro, and it was rapidly losing its ability 
to act the part of superpower by using money. Its economic model was 
increasingly rejected by developing nations (even if it was still admired 
by some Harvard economists). About the only instrument the Soviets had 
that kept them a superpower was their massive nuclear arsenal. 
In March 1983, the same month as the "Evil Empire" speech, Reagan 
proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative, usually called the "Star Wars" 
plan. Without going into details, Reagan called upon American scientists 
to create a way to destroy nuclear missiles before they could reach the 
United States. While there was great skepticism about the practical pos-
sibility of deploying such a system, there can be no question about its 
political and diplomatic impact. Reagan repeatedly expressed the hope 
that nuclear weapons could be made obsolete. For the Soviets, this meant 
losing their superpower status. 
The Star Wars proposal generated almost as much opposition in 
Washington as it did in Moscow. Few observers were quite sure what 
impact the proposal would have on continuing arms control talks with 
the Soviets. One expert described the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
as a decision by Reagan to take the most basic question of national secu-
rity, survival in the nuclear age, out of the hands of American diplomats 
and to place it in the hands of American scientists and technicians, who 
were the best in the world. It is not surprising that the diplomats took a 
dim view of their replacement. Moreover, by denying the Soviets the use 
of nuclear weapons, Reagan was implicitly rejecting containment once 
again and looking toward the day when the U.S.S.R. would no longer 
exist. Many foreign policy profeSSionals either rejected that vision or were 
simply unable to imagine it. 
The most optimistic estimate of the time when SOl might be deploy-
able was the early 1990s. In the meantime, Reagan moved to implement 
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the fourth prong of his anti-Soviet offensive, which was a military chal-
lenge to the Soviets. As we saw in chapter 1, the Soviets and their allies 
were militarily active in Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, 
southern Africa, and Central America. Since the 1960s, the Soviets had 
been on the offensive in the small-scale proxy wars that marked the mid-
dle years of the Cold War. 
By the middle of the 1980s, the Soviets and their allies would be 
facing anti-Communist guerrilla movements. But in 1981, except for assis-
tance to the Afghan resistance, the United States was not yet able to turn 
the tables on the Soviets. They would retain the initiative a while lon-
ger, but in the meantime, Reagan was determined to counter the attacks 
of guerrilla armies funded and supplied by the U.S.S.R. more forcefully 
and effectively. Put differently, Reagan intended first to stop the forward 
momentum of Communism, preparatory to reversing that momentum. 
As usual, Reagan had other goals in mind as well: promoting democ-
racy, freeing developing economies, and shrinking the power of the U.S. 
foreign policy bureaucracy. Confronting Soviet expansion was, however, 
the primary goal. 
Reagan was much in the same position as U.S. war planners in 1942, 
after the Japanese had launched successful offensives at Pearl Harbor, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Guam, Hong Kong, and the Dutch East Indies. By 
July, Australia itself was threatened by the Japanese offensive at Guadalca-
nal. It was not the most auspicious place for the United States to begin its 
counterattack. The Japanese knew the area, they were already entrenched, 
and they were beginning their final offensive to seize the rest of the island 
Japanese troops were able to present themselves as the liberators from 
colonialism. Few Americans, on the other hand, knew or cared about 
Guadalcanal, and some of those who did questioned its importance in 
the war's overall strategy. Fighting in a Dutch colony would bring political 
complications also. Finally, there were serious problems of logisticS and 
supply, especially with the U.S. military stretched to the breaking point by 
commitments elsewhere in the world. A counteroffensive at Guadalcanal 
promised to be long, difficult, and risky. 
In 1981, an eerily analogous situation existed in Central America. 
The Soviets and Cubans were already there, and the Cubans knew the 
region. The Salvadoran guerrillas had just begun their Final Offensive 
to take over the country. Leftist guerrillas portrayed themselves as anti-
imperialists. Few Americans were familiar with the conflicts in Central 
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America, and fewer still were convinced of the wisdom of confronting 
the Soviets there, with the American military facing challenges all over 
the globe. Like Guadalcanal, Central America was the key to a continent, 
in this case, North America. Assistance to the Salvadoran government 
promised to be fraught with political difficulties. The American presence 
in El Salvador would be long, difficult, and risky. 
Yet, like the Japanese in Guadalcanal, the Soviet proxies in El Sal-
vador were at the extreme end of a long and tenuous supply line and an 
even more tenuous political alliance. Moreover, El Salvador, for all of the 
political and logistical challenges it posed, was the place where confront-
ing the Soviets was most urgent. While continuing to prepare for other 
offensives in other places, the Reagan administration ignored the skeptics 
and openly confronted the Soviets for the first time in Central America. 
El Salvador would become the Cold War's Guadalcanal. 
